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Abstract
During the last three decades, most developed countries have expe-
rienced increasing income inequality. Using Danish register data from
1992 to 2007 for all private-sector employees, we conÖrm that income
inequality has increased in Denmark. We also observe an increase
in the relative employment of highly-educated individuals, as well as
di§erential income growth rates across employee subgroups where, in
particular, managers experienced signiÖcant real income progression.
We use an equilibrium search framework with on-the-job search to
derive the income distribution. In this model we can determine the
management and education premia. We can also show that when our
model is exposed to skill-upgrading it is capable of producing income
dynamics similar to those observed in the Danish income distribution.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, most developed countries have experienced in-
creasing income inequality (OECD, 2007). A recent OECD report (OECD,
2011) pointed out that also traditionally low-inequality countries such as
Denmark, Germany and Sweden experienced signiÖcant increases in income
inequality during the 2000s. In Denmark the average annual percentage
change in income was one percent over the period mid-1980s to late 2000s.
But, income progression was very unequal across income deciles. While, the
bottom decile experienced annual income growth of only 0.7 percent the top
decile had earnings growth of 1.5 percent. Other sources also point towards
increasing income inequality in Denmark. For example, Atkinson and S¯-
gaard (2013) study income inequality in Denmark over the past century and
Önd that income inequality at present is at a relatively low level - but that
income inequality has been on the rise since the early 90ies.
In this paper, we intend to shed light on the causes of the increasing in-
come inequality observed in Denmark during the period 1992 to 2007. We
do so using register-based employer-employee data. We Önd that income
inequality has indeed increased in Denmark during this period. We also
show that this increase occurred during a period where the ináow of highly-
educated workers into the labor market was substantial and management
compensation grew steadily. To better understand this interplay between
skill-upgrading, management compensation and income inequality, we pro-
pose an equilibrium search model where the Örm has an explicit organiza-
tional structure. An important feature of this model is that the endogenously
determined management and education premia (two important drivers for in-
come inequality) can be established and studied. Furthermore, this model is
capable of reproducing the dynamics in income inequality observed in Den-
mark over the sample period when it is subjected to skill-upgrading.
Our focus on skill-upgrading and management compensation as drivers
for income inequality implies that our paper is in line with a large U.S. lit-
erature on income inequality (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce, 1993; Katz and Autor, 1999).1 This literature documents a sub-
stantial widening of U.S. income distribution during the 80s and establishes
that the action in the income distribution is at the top income percentiles
(where most managers are located). The literature also documents that the
supply of highly-educated labor grew steadily in the U.S. during the 80s.
1Other seminal papers in the Öeld (the list is by no means exhaustive) are Autor, Katz,
and Kearney (2008), Bartel and Sicherman (1999), Bound and Johnson (1992), DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010), Levy and Murnane (1992),
Murphy and Welch (1992), and Piketty and Saez (2003).
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More recent papers by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) and Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) have revisited the question of growing income inequal-
ity in the U.S. using data for the 90s. They Önd that the increase in income
inequality has continued, however at a slower pace. On reason is that real
wage growth was U-shaped in the U.S. in the 90s.2
Our analysis also complements the existing Danish literature on income
inequality. A recent contribution by Neamtu and WestergÂrd-Nielsen (2013)
investigates changes in Danish income inequality with a focus on the e§ects
of changing demographics, family formation and aging. Bj¯rnskov et. al.
(2013) takes a related approach but include a discussion of social impacts
and political economy. Finally, Atkinson and S¯gaard (2013) take the long-
term perspective and establish how income inequality has changed during
the last 140 years. Our paper adds to this literature by investigating the
interplay between skill-upgrading, management compensation and income
inequality.
We start our analysis by investigating change in Danish income inequal-
ity using register-based employer-employee data for all private sector workers
between 1992 and 2007. We establish three empirical results. First, in line
with previous evidence, we document that Danish income inequality has been
rising. Second, the employment share of highly educated individuals has in-
creased substantially both in management and non-management. Third, all
employee subgroups (deÖned by education level and organizational place-
ment) have real income progression, but the growth rates are signiÖcantly
higher for employees in managerial positions. Thus, the changes in Danish
income inequality share many of the features found for the U.S., but it is
also apparent that a pure skill story cannot fully account for the observed
changes in income inequality, as there are signiÖcant di§erences in the ways
management and non-management incomes evolve.
To better understand the dynamics in the income distribution, we build
a theoretical model. The model is similar to existing hierarchical search
models with on-the-job search; see Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Dolado et
al. (2009), Gautier (2002), Gautier, Teulings, and van Vuuren (2006), Pis-
sarides (1994), and Wong (2003).3 In these models, jobs are heterogeneous
2Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) argue that their Öndings follow from the fact that
neither high-skill tasks nor low-skill tasks can be computerized (but average-skill tasks
can). This implies a steady increase in the demand for workers with low and high education
levels whereas the demand for individuals with medium-skills are in decline. These Öndings
are not unique to the U.S. as extant work by Goos and Manning (2007) and by Goos,
Manning, and Salomons (2009) show, that job polarization also occurs in most European
countries (including Denmark) during this period.
3We stress that we use the terms ëhierachyí and ëhierachicalí in a slightly di§erent way
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and have skill requirements, and workers are heterogeneous in their educa-
tion levels. These papers classify workers as either low- or highly-educated
and jobs as either ësimpleí or ëcomplexí. In this paper, we focus on explain-
ing income inequality in a period of signiÖcant skill-upgrading and strong
growth in management compensation. For that reason, we maintain the no-
tion of highly- and less-educated workers. However, we explicitly distinguish
between managerial and non-managerial jobs and refer to ësimpleí jobs as
ënon-managementí jobs and ëcomplexí jobs as ëmanagementí jobs.
On one important dimension, our model di§ers from previous work: we
do not restrict the job search of less-educated employees. Existing models
assume that management jobs (ëcomplexí jobs) require a higher education.
However, empirically, we see that a signiÖcant proportion of managers do
not possess college or university degrees, and for that reason, we allow for
the possibility that less-educated workers obtain management jobs. This
changes the search behavior of less-educated workers and alters the model in
interesting ways.
One implication of relaxing the job search assumption for less-educated
workers is that we operate with four di§erent education-job match types,
whereas previous papers have only had three. To be more speciÖc, de-
note a management and non-management job by M and NM, and low and
high education as L and H, respectively. Our model then allows for four
match types: (H,NM), (L,NM), (H,M), and (L,M), whereas existing mod-
els exclude the latter. Furthermore, because the productivity of the worker
depends on the workerís education level and job type, we impose the in-
nocuous assumption that highly-educated workers are more productive than
less-educated workers (conditional on job level), and we follow Lucas (1978)
and Rosen (1982) and assume that workers in non-management have lim-
ited discretion over resources and hence are less productive than employees
in management jobs (conditional on the workerís education level). Hence,
the productivities of workers in each of these matches are ranked as follows:
(L;NM) < (H;NM) < (L;M) < (H;M).
These distinguishing features of our model generate two predictions about
income inequality that match general empirical Öndings in the Danish reg-
ister data and, more generally, in OECD countries. First, conditional on
than in the existing papers. In the latter, ëhierarchyí refers to a one-to-one mapping of
workers to job types, where the highest worker type is assigned to the highest job type and
vice versa (see Gautier, Teulings, and Vuuren (2006), p. 118). In this paper, ëhierarchyí
refers to the internal structure of the Örm. It is used to indicate that Örms have a pyramidal
structure, i.e. have more jobs in non-management than in management and that workers
in management jobs are more productive than workers in non-management. For empirical
evidence on this, see Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (forthcoming).
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education levels, managers earn higher wages than non-managers. We refer
to this as the ëmanagement premiumí. The management premium is endoge-
nously derived in the model and follows from two sources: managers are more
productive than non-managers and they do not search on the job. Hence, the
Örm rewards them for being more productive and for staying longer. This
new feature of the model implies wage dispersion within education levels for
both highly-educated and less-educated employees.
Second, contrary to other models with on-the-job-search, such as Gautier
(2002) and Dolado et al. (2009), our model can generate an ëeducation
premiumí in both management and non-management, which implies that
highly-educated workers earn more in both sectors. This result can only be
obtained in models where less-educated workers can search for ëcomplexí jobs,
which, in the context of our model, implies the presence of an internal labor
market where both highly- and less-educated workers can obtain management
jobs.
The equilibrium income distribution derived from our model is critically
dependent on the productivity, the bargaining power, and the educational
composition in the labor market. This implies that a shock to any of these
parameters alters the income distribution by changing relative wages and em-
ployment shares. Prior research on income inequality has had a focus on the
steady increase in the number of highly educated individuals who enter the
labor market. We contribute to this research agenda by deriving the compar-
ative statics for the steady state employment shares and wages, and Önd that
the predicted e§ects of skill-upgrading are similar to the recently observed dy-
namics in the Danish income distribution. That is, skill-upgrading increases
the employment shares of highly-educated employees, increases compensation
for all employees, and leads to relatively higher income growth for workers
with management jobs. Combined these e§ects increase income inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
describe the changes that have occurred in the Danish income distribution
during recent years. In Section 3, we present the theoretical model, and the
equilibrium is derived in Section 4. In Section 5, we present some comparative
statics. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes. Proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The Danish Income Distribution
In this section, we describe changes in Danish income distribution between
1992 and 2007. The main Önding is that income inequality in the private
sector in Denmark has been rising, caused by changes both in the employment
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composition and relative incomes of employees. Most pronounced is the
increase in the employment share of highly-educated employees, but relative
incomes have also been altered substantially, with income increasing more
rapidly for managerial employees who are positioned at the upper income
percentiles.
2.1 The Data
The empirical analysis is conducted using register-based employer-employee
data from Denmark between 1992 and 2007.4 This database contains detailed
information about all employers and employees. Of particular importance to
the present analysis is the fact that employees and companies can be matched
and that this information can be combined with further information on the
employeesí education levels, incomes, and job assignments. The database
contains more than one million observations per year resulting in 18,406,618
person-year observations in total.
We divided the sample into four employee groups: less-educated non-
managers, highly-educated non-managers, less-educated managers, and highly-
educated managers. In order to be considered highly-educated, the employee
must have at least a college degree (or in the Danish context, a Bachelorís
degree). Managers are identiÖed using the International Standard Classi-
Öcation of Occupations (ISCO) from the International Labor Organization
(ILO). DeÖning a manager as an individual assigned to ISCO Major Group
One, which comprises corporate managers and general managers, 4.4 percent
of the sample are managers.
2.2 The Income Distribution
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics that characterize the income distribu-
tion. Less-educated employees in non-management jobs constitute the largest
employee subgroup, representing almost 87 percent of the sample in 1992, but
highly-educated non-managers also constitute a signiÖcant proportion of the
employees (8 percent in 1992). The two management groups (highly and
less-educated) are relatively small, with proportions between one and four
percent.
4The resister data is known as the IDA-database (den Integrerede Database for Arbejds-
markedsforskning) and is constructed by Statistics Denmark (www.dst.dk). The database
contains detailed information on employers and employees from 1980 and onwards. The
information on job assignment (ISCO codes from the International Labor Organization,
www.ilo.org), that play a key role in our empirical analysis are only available from 1992,
which is the reason we focus on the year 1992 to 2007.
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[Table 1]
Turning to income, it is clearly the case that income increases with ed-
ucation and job level. All income Ögures presented in the paper are an-
nual gross real income in Euros, with 2000 as the base year.5 In 1992, the
average income was 32,000. In that year, less-educated employees in non-
management earned on average 30,000, whereas less-educated employees in
management had incomes close to 47,000 on average. The highly-educated
employees had substantially higher incomes. Highly-educated employees in
non-management made on average 48,000 in 1992, and highly-educated work-
ers in management had an average income of 74,000.6
2.3 Changes in the Income Distribution
During the sample period, the income distribution was signiÖcantly altered,
resulting in an increase in income inequality. To measure this increase we
use income inequality statistics similar to Katz and Autor (1999) and Autor,
Katz and Kearny (2008). We Önd that the standard deviation of log income
increases from 0.65 in 1992 to 0.80 in 2007, and that the Gini coe¢cient
increases from 0.42 in 1992 to 0.57 in 2007 (see Table 2). Alternative mea-
sures of income inequality are the di§erences in log percentiles. For example,
the 90-10 di§erence was 1.42 in 1992 but in 2007 it had increased to 1.88.
Hence, all of these measures of income inequality unambiguously point in the
direction of increasing inequality.7
[Table 2]
5This measure of pay contains both Öxed and variable pay components.
6While the compensation packages in Denmark for managers resemble those in other
parts of Europe, they di§er greatly from those used in the US (see Eriksson and Lausten,
2000). Eriksson and Lausten stress that a relatively small proportion of Danish Örms
have bonus and/or commission systems for their managers, and they show that only 20-
25 percent of all managers and a third of the CEOs are paid bonuses or commissions.
Furthermore, their share of total compensation varies between 10 and 12 percent. They
also refer to studies based on US and UK data that document that base pay in those
countries only account for about 50-60 percent of total compensation.
7Note that our study focuses on gross incomes for employees working in the private
sector. Other studies such as Neamtu and Westergaard-Nielsen (2013) and Bj¯rnskov et.
al., 2012) focus on household incomes in Denmark. In such studies, the rise in income
inequality is more modest. An interesting aspect of the report by Bj¯rnskov et. al. is that
they in addition to addressing changes in gross income inequality also consider changes in
income inequality when taxes and transfers are taken into account. Atkinson and S¯borg
(2013) also dive into a discussion of the impacts of the tax system on Danish income
inequality.
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Taking a closer look at the changes in income we Önd that, overall, real
income has increased by 14.29 percent or close to one percent per year. How-
ever, as depicted in Figure 1, the growth in income was unequal and increased
in the income percentile. That is, income growth increases steadily from the
lowest to the highest percentiles, but at the 90th percentile the increase be-
comes particularly steep. At the highest percentiles income growth over the
period 1992 to 2007 exceeds median income in the economy.
[Figure 1]
One explanation for the high growth in income at top percentiles is that
managerial compensation has increased signiÖcantly duing the sample pe-
riod (see Table 1). While income progression in non-management jobs has
been relatively modest (2 percent for highly-educated and 10 percent for
less-educated), management compensation has increased substantially (27
percent for highly-educated and 31 percent for less-educated). It is also clear
from Figure 1 that most managers (as expected) are located at the top income
percentiles where income progression is highest. Hence, the higher manage-
ment compensation is causing income at top percentiles to grow relatively
fast and thus pushes the upper tail of the income distribution even further
to the right, leading to an increase in income inequality.
The employment composition has also been altered during the sample
period. In particular, the increase in the share of highly-educated employees
in the workforce is noticeable (see Table 1). In the early 90s, 9 percent of
the workforce were highly-educated, but by 2007, this proportion had in-
creased to 18 percent. The composition of the managerial workforce changed
in a similar way: in 1992, less-educated employees clearly represented the
larger share of the management workforce, but by the late 2000s, the gap be-
tween less-educated and highly-educated managers was reduced signiÖcantly.
Among non-management workers, the share of highly-educated workers rose
from 8 percent to 17 percent - an increase of more than 100 percent. In
contrast, the employment share of less-educated workers in non-management
jobs has been declining steadily, from a level of 87 percent in 1992 to less
than 80 percent in 2007.
To better understand the nature of the skill-upgrading we present the
year-by-year worker mobility transition matrix in Table 3. The non-management
states are highly stable. More than 95 percent of both less- and highly-
educated employees working in non-management are working at the same
job level with the same education level in the following year. For manage-
ment employees, the numbers are 67 percent for the less-educated and 73
percent for the highly-educated. The transition probabilities show very lit-
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tle formal skill-upgrading on-the-job. Less-educated managers have a 0.13
percent probability of transiting to the highly-educated management group
in a given year. The probability of moving to the highly-educated non-
management group is even lower. Less-educated non-managers are not mov-
ing to the highly-educated manager category, and only 0.22 percent move
to the highly-educated non-manager category. If we instead look at the
áows into and out of the Örm, we can establish that, across the years, 23.27
percent of those hired into management are highly-educated, whereas only
21.52 percent of those leaving management are highly-educated. For the
non-management group, 10.89 percent of those hired are highly-educated
and only 8.85 percent of those leaving have a higher education. Hence, these
Öndings clearly show that there is very little on-the-job skill-upgrading and
that the signiÖcant skill-upgrading observed in the data is due to the hiring
of new personnel with higher levels of education.
[Table 3]
2.3.1 A simulation
Another way to illustrate the link between skill-upgrading, management com-
pensation and income inequality is through simulation, see Table 4. Using
data from 1992 and 2007, we Örst estimate the following log-wage regression:
lnW = ( + )Man+ ,High+X 01 + 2; (1)
where lnW is log-income, Man is a dummy for working in management,
High is a dummy for being highly-educated and X is a matrix of controls
that contains quadratics in age and experience and a dummy for gender. The
modelís parameters are: (; ); , and 1; where we denote ) the management
premium and , the education premium. 2 is an error term.
Based on separate regressions for each year, we predict wages (dlnW )
and calculate the Gini coe¢cients. The predicted Gini coe¢cient for 1992 is
0.225 and for 2007 it is 0.295. Hence, the predicted Ginis are somewhat lower
than those based on actual data (as the regression is leaving the unobserved
heterogeneity in the error term), but the result that income inequality has
increased is maintained in the predicted Gini coe¢cients.
[Table 4]
In the Örst simulation, we investigate the e§ects of skill-upgrading on
income inequality. The proportion of highly-educated workers in 1992 is 9.3
9
percent and in 2007 it is 17.9 percent. So, to simulate the e§ect of skill-
upgrading, we use the data and the estimated coe¢cient from 1992, but we
then randomly ëupgradeí the education level for 8.6 percent of less-educated
non-managers such that the proportion of highly-educated employees mirrors
that for 2007. The predicted Gini coe¢cient we obtain is 0.201. This Gini is
somewhat lower than the one observed in both 1992 and 2007. The reason is
that the upgrade of the education level has ëmovedí a signiÖcant proportion
of the low income earners into the middle of the income distribution. Hence,
skill-upgrading has a tendency to reduce income inequality. In the second
simulation, we focus on the consequences of the rising management premium
on income inequality. We evaluate the e§ect using the data and estimated
coe¢cients from 1992, and then we change the management premium to
its 2007 level. This exercise produces a predicted Gini coe¢cient of 0.297,
which is similar to the predicted Gini from 2007. In a Önal simulation,
we evaluate the joint e§ects of skill-upgrading and the rising management
premium and obtain a predicted Gini coe¢cient of 0.272.8 These results
show that the combination of skill-upgrading and the rising management
premium can explain a signiÖcant proportion of the observed increase in
income inequality.
3 The Model
Time is assumed to be continuous. Consider a Örm with management (M)
and non-management (N) sectors that face a labor force of ' workers. The
workers employed by the Örm are members of the internal labor market,
denoted by I; the remaining individuals constitute the external labor force,
E. The size of the total labor force is normalized to unity, i.e., ' = I+E = 1.
All workers are distinguished by an observable level of education, where the
proportion 6 of the workers is less-educated and the remaining 1#6 is highly-
educated. Highly-educated workers will be referred to as H workers, while
less-educated workers will be referred to as L workers. We use the notation
k = L;H to denote a workerís education level and 8 = N;M to denote a
sector.
8Note that the predicted Gini coe¢cient for the simulation where we investigate the
joint e§ects of skill-upgrading and the rising management premium is 0.272, whereas the
predicted Gini coe¢cient based on the 2007 data is 0.295. The di§erence between these two
numbers can be contributed to other changes in workforce composition or ëpricesí between
1992 and 2007. Descriptive statistics for the two years show that more women have joined
the workforce and that the workforce has become slightly older and more experienced
over time. For a discussion of these complementary drivers for income inequality, see for
instance Neamtu and Westergaard-Nielsen (2013).
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When the Örm opens up a vacancy, its type is determined ex-ante. The
Örm can open up vacancies in management and non-management. We denote
vacancies in non-management vN .9 Vacancies in management are denoted
vkM and have skill requirements, i.e., they can only be Ölled by individu-
als who have the required education level k = L;H. For reasons explained
below, individuals in management jobs have the highest productivity. This
implies that employees with the required level of education from both the
non-management sector of the internal labor market ikN and the external
labor market ek apply for management vacancies vkM .10 It also implies that
because managers ikM have no incentives to search for a new job, only exter-
nal candidates apply for non-management jobs.
Workers and vacancies meet each other randomly according to the Cobb-
Douglas matching function. This means that the matching of a job in the
non-management sector and a worker of any skill level from outside the Örm
is given by
xN = xN(vN ; eL + eH) = (vN)
&(eL + eH)
1"&: (2)
In the management sector, workers of skill level k are matched with vacancies
9Note that we denote a vacancy in the non-management sector simply as vN where
vLN = vHN = vN , since both highly-educated and less-educated workers can apply for a
job in the non-management sector.
10Note that this setup mirrors the one found in, for example, tournament theory (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981), which is an alternative (partial equilibrium) setup that can be used to
model internal promotions and external recruitment. Tournament theory provides an in-
tuitive framework for modeling promotions in Örms, and it is interesting to note that
promotions in tournament games and promotions (workers matched to management jobs)
through a matching function are qualitatively indistinguishable. The reason is that pro-
motions from the contestant pool in a tournament game appear random ex post. That is,
in tournament theory, individuals are competing for a Öxed number of prizes (promotions).
The prizes (pay gaps between management and non-management jobs that are set ex ante
by the Örm) motivate employees to exert e§ort, and because employees are identical in
terms of ability, they are all motivated to exert the same level of e§ort. Hence, because
productivity is a function of ability, e§ort, and luck, the luck component determines who is
promoted. When this framework is extended to situations with heterogeneous individuals
(such as settings where individuals have di§erent levels of ability or education), competi-
tion is no longer ìfair,î and to mitigate this issue, Örms should set up multiple tournaments
such that each tournament only involves similar individuals (McLaughlin, 1988). Further-
more, Örms should make use of both internal promotions and external recruitment when
Ölling management positions to discourage workers from colluding (Chan, 1996). Hence,
while our model abstracts from the underlying motivational story, its structure mirrors
that of tournament theory. That is, management jobs are Ölled with both internal and
external candidates who have the appropriate education level.
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requiring skill k, where k = L;M; as follows:
xkM = xkM(vkM ; eL + ikN) = (vkM)
&(eL + ikN)
1"&: (3)
The labor market áows are illustrated in Figure 2. Individuals in the ex-
ternal labor market may get jobs in both non-management and management.
When an individual obtains employment in the non-management sector of a
Örm, they have an option to be promoted. Since jobs in management have
educational requirements, both less- and highly-educated employees from the
non-management sector can be promoted. All employees have an exogenous
separation risk; hence, there are áows from both the management and non-
management sectors back into the external labor market.
[Figure 2]
A workerís output is denoted by yk' , where yk' = >k'y; y is the level
of output produced by less-educated workers in non-management jobs and
k = L;H; 8 = N;M . We make three assumptions about workersí productiv-
ity. First, highly-educated workers in any given job are always more produc-
tive than less-educated workers in the same job type, i.e., >H' > >L' . Second,
we follow Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) in assuming that workers in non-
management jobs have limited discretion over resources and hence are less
productive than employees in management jobs, who control resources, i.e.,
>kM > >kN . And Önally, we assume that less-educated workers in manage-
ment are more productive than highly-educated workers in non-management
jobs. These three assumptions ensure that 1 = >LN < >HN < >LM < >HM .
Labor market tightness in the market for non-management jobs is deÖned
as
@N =
vN
(eL + eH)
: (4)
Similarly, the labor market tightness variables in the market for management
jobs of skill k, k = L;M are deÖned as
@kM =
vkM
(ek + ikN)
: (5)
This allows us to deÖne the rates at which a k-type job in the non-management
sector meets a worker of type k as
qN(@N) =
xN
vN
; (6)
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where k = L;H and qkN = qN . Similarly, a k-type job in the management
sector meets a worker of skill level k, k = L;M; as follows:
qkM(@kM) =
xkM
vkM
: (7)
We also deÖne the rates at which a worker of type k encounters a vacancy in
the non-management sector and the management sector as
pN(@N) =
xN
(eL + eH)
; (8)
pkM(@kM) =
xkM
(ek + ikM)
; (9)
where k = L;H.
4 Payo§ Functions and Wage Determination
The Örm maximizes the present discounted value (PDV) of expected proÖts,
and the individual maximizes the PDV of the expected income stream. The
Örm decides if a particular vacancy should be opened or not. The individual
assesses if the job o§er received is su¢ciently attractive, taking into account
alternatives such as other job opportunities or continued job search. When
the worker and the Örm meet, they bargain over the wage. In the following
sections, we describe these processes.
4.1 The Firm
The Örm advertises three di§erent types of jobs: a vacancy in non-management
and two vacancies in management. The management jobs require di§erent
levels of education, but the non-management vacancy can be Ölled with a
worker of any educational level. Hence, in practice, the Örm employs up to
four di§erent employee types: less-educated in non-management jobs, highly-
educated in non-management jobs, less-educated in management jobs, and
highly-educated in management jobs. These types generate di§erent levels of
proÖts, since they di§er in their productivities and, as will be shown below,
have di§erent costs.
We denote the expected PDV of having a vacant non-management job
by VkN , where VLN = VHN . The expected PDV of the vacancy depends on
the potential workerís productivity. For this reason, we denote the PDV of a
vacancy Ölled with an employee of type k by JkN . Furthermore, under perfect
competition, the PDV of expected proÖt from a vacant non-management job,
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VkN ; equals the rate of return. Recalling that the job is Ölled by a highly-
educated or a less-educated worker with probability qN ; the rate of return can
be written as the di§erence between the vacancy cost of a non-management
job, cN , and the expected return from having the job Ölled. The expected
return from having the position occupied is equal to the sum of the returns
generated by less-educated employees and the returns generated by highly-
educated employees weighted by the relative population size. This implies
that the following equation will be satisÖed in equilibrium11:
rVkN =
xN
vN
"
eLJLN + eHJHN
eL + eH
# VkN
#
# cN ; (10)
where r is the rate of return and VLN = VHN . This equation says that
the expected income stream for a vacancy in the non-management sector is
equal to the probability
$
xN
vN
%
that the vacancy meets either a highly or less-
educated worker times the expected rents of a match with this worker, which
depends on the stock of less- and highly-educated workers in the external
labor market and on the composition of the workforce.
Using the same reasoning, the PDV of expected proÖt for a non-management
job Ölled by a worker of type k, JkN ; equals its return. In this case, the re-
turn is the output produced by the worker, ykN ; minus wkN , the wage paid
to the worker. In addition to this, the eventual loss of revenue that occurs
if the worker and the Örm separate, which happens with probability s; and
the potential loss if the worker Önds a job in the management sector must
be added. Thus,
rJkN = ykN # wkN + s(VkN # JkN) + pkM(VkN # JkN): (11)
Similar expressions can be derived for management. When the PDV of ex-
pected proÖt for a vacant management job, VkM ; equals its rate of return, we
obtain:
rVkM = qkM(JkM # VkM)# ckM ; (12)
where ckM are the vacancy costs.
Finally, recalling that management employees do not search for other
employment, it follows that when equating the PDV of expected proÖt from
a Ölled management job, JkM ; to the return, we get
rJkM = ykM # wkM + s(VkM # JkM); (13)
11This equation is similar to equation (16) in Gautier (2002).
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where wkM are the wages paid to an employee of type k working in manage-
ment.
4.2 The Workers
A worker of type k earns wkN when employed in a non-management job and
wkM when working in a management job. For simplicity, we normalize an
employeeís income in the external labor market to zero.
Let Ek be the PDV of income for a type k worker in the external la-
bor market. The individual may move to a job in either non-management
or management. The Örst event occurs with probability pN . The worker
would then earn the PDV of the expected income stream WkN until a job in
management arrives or a separation from the Örm occurs. If the individual
instead gets a job in management (which occurs at rate pkM), the PDV of
the expected income stream is WkM until separation. Hence, Ek is equal to
the expected gain when obtaining a job:
rEk = pN(WkN # Ek) + pkM(WkM # Ek): (14)
The payo§ to a worker in a non-management job is given by the wage wkN ;
the risk premium against separation, and the option value of being promoted.
It follows that:
rWkN = wkN + s(Ek #WkN) + pkM(WkM #WkN): (15)
Finally, employees already working in management do not search for a new
job, but they face an exogenous separation rate, s: Thus,
rWkM = wkM + s(Ek #WkM): (16)
4.2.1 Wage Determination
Wage determination in this model is similar to that of Pissarides (1994,
2000). In equilibrium, occupied jobs in management and non-management
generate pure economic rent, and the wages paid by the Örm to its employees
pass along some of the rent. In the Pissarides model, workers perform on-
the-job searches. As pointed out by Shimer (2006), this implies that the
set of feasible payo§s over which wages are bargained is not convex and
that a unique solution to the Nash bargaining rule used by Pissarides (1994,
2000) may no longer exist. We overcome this problem by using the solution
proposed in Dolado et al. (2009), that assumes that wages are determined
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by a surplus splitting rule after the job is accepted, with unemployment as
a threat point. This surplus sharing rule is
(1# 1k' )[Wk' # Ek] = 1k' [Jk' # Vk' ]; (17)
where k = L;H, 8 = N;M , Vk;N = VN , and 0 < 1k' < 1 represents an
employeeís bargaining power.
4.3 Steady State
For k = L;H and 8 = N;M , a steady state is a set of value functions
for Wk' ; Jk' ; VkM ; VN ; Ek that satisfy (10) to (17), and a vector (ek; @N ; @kM ;
ik' ; vN ; vkM). We derive the steady state by imposing two assumptions: Örst,
the labor market áows are stable and, second, all proÖt opportunities in the
market are exhausted such that VkN = 0 and VkM = 0.
We demonstrate the existence of a steady state by imposing a number of
su¢cient conditions (see details in the Appendix). Our existence proof is for
the case where all workers have the same bargaining power.12
There are Öve su¢cient conditions. One condition is 6 > 1=2. Recall
that 6 is the proportion of less-educated workers in the workforce and for
Denmark this proportion is 0.82 in 2007 according to Table 1.
The second condition imposes an upper limit on the productivity of
highly-educated non-managers. A numerical evaluation of the condition
(using the data from Table 1) implies that the productivity of highly ed-
ucated non-managers cannot be six times higher than the productivity of
less-educated non-managers; something which will be trivially satisÖed in
Denmark and in other countries.
The remaining three conditions are somewhat harder to interpret and we
refer the reader to the Appendix for details.
Proposition 1. There exists a steady state under the conditions (28) ñ
(32), stated in the Appendix.13 The steady state values are:
12This assumption reáects the principle of insu¢cient reason: we have researched the
literature and have not been able to Önd any empirical studies that estimate the bargaining
powers for Denmark or any other country. In fact, it seems very di¢cult if not impossible
to estimate the bargaining powers in the Nash bargaining solution. In the absence of any
information about the bargaining powers, we have therefore assumed that they are the
same. Indeed, most studies, in the absence of data, simply assume that all bargaining
powers are equal to one-half. Our assumption, that the bargaining powers are the same
(but that they do not necessarily equal one-half) is thus slightly more general than the
typical speciÖcation. We also studied a more general model, where bargaining powers
could di§er; in this setup there exists a steady state with the same wage ranking as in the
model with identical bargaining powers.
13We should note that the su¢cient conditions for existence do not imply uniqueness.
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Wages:
$ Wages in non-management are:
wkN =
1kN(r + s+ pkM + pN)>kNy
r + s+ pkM + 1kNpN
: (18)
$ Wages in management are:
wkM =
1kNpN(1# 1kM)>kNy
r + s+ pkM + 1kNpN
+ 1kMckM@kM + 1kM>kMy; (19)
where >HM > >LM > >HN > >LN = 1.
Employment shares:
$ The shares of type k workers not employed in the Örm are:
ek =
s6k
(s+ pkM + pN)
: (20)
$ The employment shares of non-management employees are:
ikN =
spN6k
(s+ pkM + pN)(s+ pkM)
: (21)
$ The employment shares of management employees are:
ikM =
pkM6k
s+ pkM
; (22)
where 6L = 6 and 6H = 1# 6.
Thus the income distribution is: w = wk' with probability ik' .
Proof. See the Appendix.
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4.4 The Management and Education Premia
Important new features in our model are the management and education
premia and for this reason they will be studied in more detail in this section.
First, the management premium for a type k worker, k = L;H, is deÖned
as the wage di§erence wkM#wkN . A su¢cient condition for the management
premium to be non-negative is
1kM>kM % 1kN>kN : (23)
By assumption >kM > >kN . Hence, there is a positive management premium
whenever 1kM % 1kN . Thus there exists a positive management premium
when bargaining powers are equal. In fact, the premium exists under weaker
conditions. In the Appendix we prove the following: for each Öxed 1kN there
is a unique critical value of 1kM , denoted 1
#
kM , where 0 < 1
#
kM < 1kN < 1,
such that the management premium is strictly negative for all 1kM satisfying
0 & 1kM < 1#kM and strictly positive for all 1kM > 1#kM . In other words, the
management premium for each type is strictly positive whenever the type
has more bargaining power in the management than in the non-management
sector, but the premium is strictly positive even when this condition fails, as
long as bargaining power in the management sector is su¢ciently high.
This result can be explained intuitively as follows. Managers are more
productive than non-managers and they stay longer on the job as they do
not perform on-the-job searches. In pay setting Örms will exploit that man-
agers do not search on-the-job and when the bargaining power of managers
is relatively low, non-managersí wages may exceed managersí wages. How-
ever, the management premium is strictly positive for higher values of the
managersí bargaining power, because the Örm rewards managers proportion-
ally more for staying longer in a job and for being more productive than
non-management workers.
Second, a positive education premium follows from the ranking of wages.
This is an important result because of its empirical backing. It is also an
important result because earlier models (such as Gautier, 2002 and Dolado et
al., 2009) produced the somewhat counter-intuitive result that less-educated
workers in ësimpleí/non-managerial jobs earned more than their highly-educated
coworkers working similar jobs. These models were also unable to establish
an education premium in the management sector; as they would have been
unable to produce a management premium for less-educated workers.
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5 Comparative Statics: Responses to Skill-
Upgrading
In this section we investigate how skill-upgrading a§ects the dynamics of the
income distribution. The main results from our comparative statics analysis
are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. An increase in 1# 6 (skill-upgrading) results in:
$ An increase in @N , @LM , and @HM
$ A decrease in the employment share of less-educated employees in both
management and non-management jobs
$ An increase in the employment share of highly-educated employees in
both management and non-management jobs
$ An increase in 1 # 6 also increases the wages of all employees. Fur-
thermore, wages of management workers increase more than wages of
non-management workers
Proof. See the Appendix.
The e§ect of skill-upgrading on wages and employment shares can be ex-
plained as follows. Skill-upgrading, i.e., a fall in 6, means that the pro-
portion of less-educated workers in the total workforce declines. There are
now fewer less-educated workers competing for the existing vacancies in non-
management and management, implying that more highly-educated workers
will be employed in non-management jobs. At the same time, it will allow
less-educated workers to be promoted faster to low-skill jobs in management.
Hence, in order to attract and retain workers in the non-management sector,
the Örm has to increase wages in this sector. This beneÖts all workers em-
ployed in the non-management sector. In the management sector, low-skill
vacancies are now harder to Öll (due to the fall in the number of appli-
cants), and as a result, wages for less-educated employees in management
will increase. For highly-educated workers, skill-upgrading means that there
is less competition from less-educated for non-management jobs, but more
competition from other highly-educated workers for any type of job. For a
given number of vacancies, this means that labor market tightness for highly-
educated management jobs will initially fall.
However, skill-upgrading induces Örms to open more vacancies for the
highly-educated and fewer vacancies for the less-educated in the managerial
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sector. Skill-upgrading also means that the average worker that the Örm
meets will be more educated and thus more productive, generating a higher
match value for the Örm than previously. If the number of vacant jobs for
the highly-educated workers increases in the management sector, then labor
market tightness for highly-educated management jobs (@HM) increases. This
means that the job Önding rate for managerial skilled jobs increases, implying
that wages in the non-managerial jobs have to rise further, and so on and
so forth... The result is that wages in all jobs rise. The fact that the wages
of managers (both less- and highly-educated) rise faster than the wages of
non-managers is evident from the wage expressions derived in Proposition
1: as both labor market tightness parameters in the management sector
increase, part of the ìrewardî received by managers (the term 1kMckM@kM)
also increases.
In conclusion, we see that skill-upgrading increases the employment share
of highly-educated employees and drives up wages for all employees. Further-
more, the wages of managers increase more than the wages of non-managers.
Thus, when our model is exposed to skill-upgrading it is capable of repli-
cating the observed changes in the Danish income distribution between 1992
and 2007.
6 Conclusion
Income inequality has risen in most developed countries during recent decades.
In this paper, we present an equilibrium search model that makes it possi-
ble to study the mechanisms leading to this change in income distribution.
In particular, the e§ects resulting from skill-upgrading can be analyzed and
explained. A detailed analysis shows that when our model is exposed to
skill-upgrading it is capable of replicating the recent dynamics in the Dan-
ish income distribution. That is, it produces an increase in the employment
share of highly-educated employees and drives up compensation for all em-
ployees, particularly for those working in management. This in turn leads to
increasing income inequality.
An innovation of our model is that we explicitly model the structure
of the Örm (i.e., we allow for a non-management sector and a management
sector). This allows us to endogenously establish a management premium and
thus provide an explanation for why observationally identical employees (in
terms of education) are paid di§erent wages; an issue that has been discussed
extensively in the literature (see Mortensen, 2003). Furthermore, modeling
of the Örmís structure also turns out to be essential for understanding the
observed increase in income inequality, as a signiÖcant contributor to the
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widening of the income distribution is the relatively high income growth
of managers. The present paper attempts to model and understand the
interplay between skill-upgrading, management compensation and income
inequality.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Deriving the Wages of non-management and Man-
agement Employees
We assume >LN = 1 and that yk' = >k'y. The wages of each type of employee
in di§erent jobs follow from the sharing rule (17) and equations (12), (14),
and (16). First,
rEk = pN
1kN(>kNy # wkN)
(1# 1kN)(r + s+ pkM)
+ pkM
1kMckM
(1# 1kM)qkM
: (24)
Using (24) to substitute for Ek in equations (12) and (13), we get
wkN =
1kN(r + s+ pkM + pN)y
r + s+ pkM + 1kNpN
;
wkM =
1kN(1# 1kM)>HNypN
r + s+ pHM + 1kNpN
+ 1kMckM@kM + 1kM>kMy:
8.2 Deriving the Steady State Employment Shares
The steady state condition equates the áow of workers into a given job to
the áow of workers out of that job. The áows in and out of non-management
jobs can be expressed as
pNek = (s+ pkM)ikN
and in management, we have
pkM(ek + ikN) = sikN
since
ikN + ikM + ek = 6k
where 6k = 6 if k = L, and 6k = 1# 6 if k = H: It follows that
ek =
s6k
(s+ pkM + pN)
ikM =
pkM6k
(s+ pkM)
and
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ikN =
spN6k
(s+ pkM + pN)(s+ pkM)
:
8.3 Existence of Equilibrium
The existence proof is standard: we need to show that the determinant of
the Jacobian matrix associated with the following equations (25) and (26) is
non-zero in the steady state:
F1 = cN@
1"&
N =
(1# 6)(1# 1LN)KL+1>HNy
(6@&HM # 6@&LM + KL+1)(KH + 1HN@&N)
+
6KH+1(1# 1LN)y
(6@&HM # 6@&LM + KL+1)(KL + 1LN@&N)
; (25)
and
ckM@
1"&
kM =
(1# 1kM)>kMy # 1kMckM@kM
(r + s)
#@
&
N(1# 1kM)1kN>kNy
(r + s)(Kk + 1kN@
&
N)
; (26)
where
Kk = r + s+ @
&
kM
and
Kk+1 = @
&
kM + s+ @
&
N :
We refer to (26) as F2 for k = L and F3 for k = H.
Denote the Jacobian matrix as J , with determinant DetJ . Since the
derivatives F2;+HM and F3;+LM equal zero, this determinant simpliÖes to
DetJ = F1;+NF2;+LMF3;+HM # F1;+LMF2;+NF3;+HM # F1;+HMF2;+LMF3;+N : (27)
Given the large number of parameters of the model, there are many sets
of su¢ciency conditions that ensure that this determinant has the required
non-zero sign. In what follows, we are content with obtaining su¢ciency
conditions for the determinant to be strictly positive, and for the case where
the bargaining power across worker occupations and skill levels are the same:
1LM = 1HM = 1LN = 1HN ' 1.
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Lemma 1 Assuming 1LM = 1HM = 1LN = 1HN ' 1, DetJ > 0 when the
following conditions hold.
6 > 1=2 (28)
6(pHM # pLM) < min[(1# 1)pN ; 1pN ] (29)
>HN <
2# 6
1# 6 (30)
cLM@
1"&
LM (1# () +
cLM@LM1
r + s
<
@&N@
&
LMy1((1# 1)
(r + s)(KL + @
&
N1)
2
(31)
cHM@
1"&
HM(1# () +
cHM@HM1
r + s
<
@&N@
&
HM>HNy1((1# 1)
(r + s)(KH + @
&
N1)
2
: (32)
Proof. A su¢cient condition for DetJ > 0 is that F1;+NF2;+LMF3;+HM > 0,
F1;+LMF2;+NF3;+HM < 0, and F1;+HMF2;+LMF3;+N < 0.
A su¢cient condition for the Örst term in (27) to be strictly positive is
F1;+N > 0 and F2;+LM < 0 and F3;+HM < 0. It can be shown that F1;+N > 0
when (29) holds. The second condition holds i§ (31) holds. Moreover, we
have F3;+HM < 0 i§ (32) holds.
The second term in (27) is strictly negative when F1;+LMF2;+NF3;+HM < 0.
It can be shown that F2;+N > 0 always, and, as stated above, F3;+HM < 0
because of (32). Thus the second term in (27) is strictly negative when
F1;+LM > 0; the latter holds when (28) and (30) hold (again, full details are
available from the authors upon request).
The last term in (27) is strictly negative when F1;+HMF2;+LMF3;+N < 0. It
can be shown that we always have F3;+N > 0 and that we have F1;+HM > 0
when (28) holds. Finally, F2;+LM < 0 i§ (31).
8.4 The Management Premium
Here we prove the following: For each Öxed 1kN there is for type k a unique
critical value of 1kM , denoted 1
#
kM , where 0 < 1
#
kM < 1kN < 1, and such
that the management premium is strictly negative for all 1kM satisfying
0 & 1kM < 1#kM and strictly positive for all 1kM > 1#kM . The proof is as
follows.
We consider the management premium as a function of the bargain-
ing powers 1kM and 1kN , and so introduce the notation wkM # wkN '
fk(1kM ; 1kN). The following lemma states that a su¢cient condition for
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the management premium to be positive for type k is that type k has greater
bargaining power in the management than in the non-management sector.
Lemma 2 f(1kM ; 1kN) > 0 whenever 1kM > 1kN .
Proof. The wage wkM can be written as
wkM =
y
A
[(r + s+ pkM + 1kMpN)1kM>kM + 1kN(1# 1kM)>kNpN ]+1kMckM@kM ;
where A = r + s + pkM + 1kNpN . The management premium can then be
written as
y
A
[(r + s+ pkM + 1kMpN)1kM>kM + 1kN(1# 1kM)>kNpN # 1kN(r + s+ pkM + pN)>kN)]
+1kMckM@kM :
A su¢cient condition for this to be strictly positive is that the expression
inside the square bracket is strictly positive. Writing all the terms inside the
square bracket out and simplifying yields
(r + s+ pkM)>kN(1kM # 1kN):
This is strictly positive i§ 1kM > 1kN .
We next consider the boundary of the parameter space, where 1kM = 0.
Lemma 3 f(0; 1kN) < 0 for all 1KN .
Proof. Setting 1kM = 0 in the expression above for wkM # wkN and simpli-
fying, the condition wkM < wkN is equivalent to 0 < 1kN(r+ s+pkM), which
holds.
Lemma 4 f(1kM ; 1kN) is strictly increasing in 1kM for any 1kN .
Proof. Since wkM but not wkN depends on 1kM , we need to prove that wkM
is increasing in 1kM . First, wkM can be written as
A+ 1kMB;
where A = 1kN>kNpny=(r + s+ pkM + 1kNpN), and
B = (r + s+ pkM + 1kNpN) [ckM@kM + >kMy # 1kN>kNpNy] :
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This expression can be further rewritten as
(r+s+pkM+1kNpN)ckM@kM+(r+s+pkM)>kMy+1kNpN>kMy#1kNpN>kNy:
The Örst three terms are positive, and the same holds for the two last since,
by assumption, >kM % >kN .
These lemmas imply the existence, for any Öxed 1kN , of a unique value of
1kM , denoted 1
#
kM , such that f(1
#
kM ; 1kN) = 0. Moreover, due to Lemma 2
and 4, we have 0 < 1#kM < 1kN < 1, and f(1kM ; 1kN) < 0 for all 0 & 1kM <
1#kM , and f(1kM ; 1kN) > 0 for all 1kM > 1
#
kM .
8.5 Comparative Statics with Respect to 6
8.5.1 Comparative Statics with Respect to the Steady State Prob-
abilities
We compute
F1;. =
y
(6@&HM + s+ @
&
N + (1# 6)@&)2
(((6@
&
HM + s+ @
&
N + @
&
LM)(s+ @
&
N + @
&
HM)(#1 + 1)
r + s+ @&LM + @
&
N1
#(6@
& + s+ @&N)(s+ @N
& + @&LM)(#1 + 1)>HN
r + s+ @&HM + @
&
N1)
) > 0
where the sign follows if we assume that the conditions for existence are
satisÖed and that
>HN >
pHM
pLM
:
It then follows, using Cramerís rule, that
@@N
@6
< 0;
@@LM
@6
< 0;
@@HM
@6
< 0:
8.5.2 Comparative Statics with Respect to the Steady State Em-
ployment Shares
Considering next the e§ect of a change of 6 on the steady state employment
shares, we get
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@iLN
@6
=
spN
(s+ pN + pLM)(s+ pLM)
+
s6
(s+ pN + pLM)2
@pN
@6
:
It can be shown that @iLN
@.
> 0 if 1 > j".;+N j. (Details are available from the
authors upon request.) Similarly, we can compute
@iHN
@6
= # spN
(s+ pN + pHM)(s+ pHM)
+
s(1# 6)(s+ pHM)2
(s+ pN + pHM)2(s+ pHM)2
@pN
@6
# s6pN(2s+ 2pHM + pN)
(s+ pN + pHM)2(s+ pHM)2
@pHM
@6
:
Su¢cient conditions for this derivative to be negative are s > pHM and
1 > j".;+HM j. Moreover,
@iLM
@6
=
pLM
s+ pLM
+
s6
(s+ pLM)2
@pLM
@6
is positive if 1 > j".;+HM j.
@iHM
@6
= # pHM
s+ pHM
+
s6
(s+ pHM)2
@pHM
@6
< 0:
8.5.3 Comparative Statics with Respect to Wages
We obtain
@wkN
@6
=
1(1# 1)>kNy(r + s+ pkM)
(r + s+ pkM + 1pkM)2
@pN
@6
# pN1(1# 1)>kNy
(r + s+ pkM + 1pkM)2
@pkM
@6
;
and
@wkM
@6
=
(1# 1)y(r + s+ pkM)
(r + s+ pkM + 1pkM)2
@pN
@6
# pN(1# 1)y
(r + s+ pkM + pkM)2
@pkM
@6
+1kM
@@kM
@6
:
If j".;+N j > j".;+kM j; we obtain the following inequalities:
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@wLN
@6
< 0;
@wHN
@6
< 0;
@wLM
@6
< 0;
@wHM
@6
< 0:
Furthermore, we see that
@wLM
@6
=
1
1
@wLN
@6
+ 1cKM
@@kM
@6
:
This means that wages in the management sector for workers of any skill
level tend to fall faster with 6 than wages in the non-management sector.
This completes the proof.
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Figure 1. The location of managers and income growth by income
percentile.
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Figure 2. Flow diagram.
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1992 2007 Change between
1992 and 2007
Employment
Less-educated
Non-management 0.867 0.795 -8.3%
Highly-educated
Non-management 0.082 0.165 101.2%
Less-educated
management 0.040 0.025 -37.5%
Highly-educated
management 0.011 0.014 27.2%
Real income*
Less-educated
Non-management
29,661
(13,709)
32,663
(16,861) 10.1%
Highly-educated
Non-management
48,318
(24,055)
49,341
(31,944) 2.1%
Less-educated
management
47,328
(31,332)
61,922
(39,006) 30.8%
Highly-educated
management
73,838
(42,531)
94,057
(75,279) 27.4%
Average real income 32,391
(18,037)
37,020
(25,940) 14.3%
Gini coefficient 0.42 0.57 0.15
*Income is measured as yearly real income in Euros, with 2000 as the base year. Observations: 18,406,618.
Table 1. Changes in relative income and employment proportions between
1992 and 2007.
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SD of log
wages
Percentiles of log income distribution Gini
coefficient
90-10 90-50 50-10
1992 0.65 1.42 0.49 0.92 0.42
2007 0.80 1.88 0.52 1.36 0.57
Table 2. Measures of income inequality in Denmark, 1992 and 2007.
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State at time t+1
Highly-educated
Management
Less-educated
Management
Highly-educated
Non-management
Less-educated
Non-management
Unemployment Retirement Other
St
ate
 at
 ti
me
 t
Highly-educated
Management
72.61 0.00 24.79 0.00 0.67 0.42 1.50
Less-educated
Management
0.13 66.86 0.04 28.40 1.19 0.79 2.60
Highly-educated
Non-management
2.48 0.00 95.17 0.00 0.94 0.32 1.09
Less-educated
Non-management
0.00 0.70 0.22 95.03 1.84 0.59 1.61
Table 3. Employment transition matrix.
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Predicted Gini
coefficient
Management
premium
(γ)
Management
composition
Education
premium
(η)
Education
composition
Controls
“prices”
(β)
Controls
composition
(age and
experience)
Year 1992 0.225 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992
Year 2007 0.295 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007
The effect of skill-upgrading 0.201 1992 1992 1992 2007* 1992 1992
The effect of the rising
management premium 0.297 2007 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992
The combined effect of skill-
upgrading and the rising
management premium
0.272 2007 1992 1992 2007* 1992 1992
Note:  *The proportion of highly-educated workers in 1992 is 9.3 percent. and in 2007 it is 17.9 percent. To simulate the effect of skill-upgrading, we use
the 1992 workforce characteristics, but we randomly `upgrade’ the education level for 8.6 percent of the less educated non-managers.
Table 4. Simulation of the importance of skill-upgrading and the rising
management premium for income inequality.
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